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hopefully will abandon Richey and its progeny 41 and adopt the
position set forth in Crittle.
Byron F. Martin III

PRETRIAL MENTAL COMMITMENT OF THE AccusED

Defendant, a twenty-seven year old, mentally deficient deaf
mute, blind in one eye and unable to read, write or otherwise
communicate, was charged with two separate robberies.1 Upon
receipt of not-guilty pleas, the trial court initiated competency
procedures.2 At a subsequent hearing, the court found the accused incapable of standing trial and ordered commitment to a
state mental institution until he attained competency. Defendant
moved for new trial, challenging Indiana's commitment criteria
as violating due process and equal protection of the law and subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court
denied the motion, and the Indiana supreme court affirmed8 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and
unanimously held that by subjecting the accused to more liberal
commitment standards and more stringent criteria for release
than applied in civil commitment proceedings, the state had deprived defendant of equal protection of the law; and that the
indefinite commitment of an accused solely because of his incapacity to stand trial violated due process of law. Jackson v. Indiana, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972).
The concept of mental capacity to stand trial was of early
common law origin,4 where a sound mind was said to be needed
41. Specifically, State v. Bell, 268 So.2d 610 (La. 1972); State v. Sheppard,
268 So.2d 590 (La. 1972).

1. "The first involved property (a purse and its contents) of the value
of four dollars. The second concerned five dollars in money." Jackson v.
State, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 1848 (1972).
2. The procedures were pursuant to BURNS' IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a
(now IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (Supp. 1971)).
3. Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487, 255 N.E.2d 515 (1970).
4. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1723-78, at 24

(Dawsons ed. 1966): "Al[s]o, if a man in his [sound memory commits a
capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought
not to be arraigned for it; becau[s]e he is not able to plead to it with that
advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the
pri[sjoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his
defense?" For an early history of incompetency proceedings, see Youtsey v.

United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). See generally the Foreword to T.
SZAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS at xix (1970).
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by the accused to grasp the reprehensible nature of his conduct. 5
Later, the basis of trial competency shifted to the procedural
fairness of due process which guaranteed the accused an opportunity to assist in his own defense. 6
Mental incapacity to proceed to trial may be raised at any
time,7 by any party to the action or by the court,8 without formal
requirements. The court's order of a mental examination is
based upon the finding of a reasonable doubt 10 as to the defendant's mental capacity. The determination is made at a contradictory hearing, and the question of trial capacity is ultimately
decided by the judge alone."
5. But see Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial commitment of Criminal
Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. Rsv. 834 (1960): "The competency rule did not
evolve from philosophical notions of punishability, but rather has deep roots
in the common law as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia;
the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present In the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself."
6. See Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956); Youtsey v. United
States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); State v. Yaun, 237 La. 186, 110 So.2d 573
(1959).
7. See, e.g., LA. CODE! CRIM. P. art. 642: "The defendant's mental incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the district
attorney, or the court. When the question of the defendant's mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no further steps in the criminal
prosecution, except the institution of prosecution, until the defendant Is
found to have the mental capacity to proceed." State v. Gunter, 208 La.
694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945). But see State v. Sinclair, 258 La. 84, 245 So.2d 365
(1971) (not rearraignment).
8. See, e.g., LA. CODs CRIM. P. art. 642; State v. Hebert, 186 La. 308, 172
So. 167 (1937).
9. "[Glenerally, in most jurisdictions the courts are not inclined to
stand on formality when the issue is fitness to proceed." Slough & Wilson,
Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. PITT. L. REv. 593, 605 (1960). See also
State v. Detar, 125 Kan. 218, 219, 263 P. 1071, 1072 (1928): "The manner in
which the necessity for an inquiry Is raised as to present insanity Is not of
much importance." See generally State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305
(1945); State v. Reed, 41 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 132 (1890).
10. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). See, e.g., LA. CoDE CRmx P. art.
643: "The court may order a mental examination of the defendant when it
has reasonable ground to doubt the defendant's mental capacity to proceed.
If the defendant does not have counsel when a mental examination is
ordered, the court shall appoint counsel to represent him prior to and at the
hearing on the question of present capacity to proceed." But see State v.
Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1966) (no absolute right).
11. "The modern trend . . . is for the judge alone to decide the matter
on the basis of evidence derived from a psychiatric examination of the accused.' A. MATTHEWS, JR., MENTAL DISABILITY & THE CRIMINAL LAW 74 (1970).
See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 647: "The issue of the defendant's mental
capacity to proceed shall be determined by the court in a contradictory
hearing. The report of the sanity commission is admissible in evidence at
the hearing, and members of the sanity commission may be called as witnesses by the court, the defense, or the district attorney. Regardless of
who calls them as witnesses, the members of the commission are subject
to cross-examination by the defense, by the district attorney, and by the
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The test presently applied, 2 by a majority of states as well
as the federal government, 18 is that the accused must lack the
capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist
in his own defense. But "mere weakness of mentality or sub4
normal intelligence does not, of itself, constitute legal insanity."
Upon adjudication of mental incapacity, criminal proceedings are
halted. 5 Subject to appellate review, the defendant is usually
committed to a mental institution for care and treatment.1 6 Unfortunately, this treatment often consists of mere custody.17
court. Other evidence pertaining to the defendant's mental capacity to
proceed may be introduced at the hearing by the defense and by the
district attorney."
12. The terms "present insanity, lack of fitness to proceed, insanity at
time of trial, mental incapacity to proceed" are used interchangeably by the
courts. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960): "[T]he 'test must
be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'"
Accord, State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So.2d 311 (1969); State v. Augustine, 252 La. 983, 215 So.2d 634 (1968); State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d
546, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 843 (1962).
13. "Many states, as well as the federal government, have merely codified
the common law test of incompetency, under which the focus is upon the
defendant's capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him and to make a rational defense." Note, 81 HARD. L. Rsv. 454, 457
(1967). See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 641: "Mental incapacity to proceed
exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently
lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist
in his defense."
14. State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 772, 244 So.2d 200, 210 (1971). See State
v. Edwards, 257 La. 707, 243 So.2d 806 (1971); State v. Augustine, 252 La.
983, 996-97, 215 So.2d 634, 638-39 (1968): "A conclusion that one is mentally
retarded or defective or diseased does not of itself establish present insanity. However, when mental retardation or defect or disease, alone or in
combination, Is so severe that a defendant Is unable to understand the object, nature, and consequences of the proceedings against him, to communicate with counsel In a meaningful manner, to recall and relate the circumstances connected with the offense, to testify In his own behalf, and to assist
reasonably and rationally in a defense of the charge against him, that defendant Is, within the contemplation of our law, presently insane and unable
to stand trial." However, the exactness of this test has been soundly criticized. See F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED & THE
LAw 359 (1961).
15. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRim. P. art. 648: "The criminal prosecution shall
be resumed if the court determines that the defendant has the mental capacity to proceed. If the court determines that the defendant lacks mental
capacity to proceed, the proceedings shall be suspended and the court shall
commit the defendant to a proper state mental institution for custody, care,
and treatment as long as the lack of capacity continues."
16. "In at least thirty-nine jurisdictions hospitalization of persons adjudged Incapable of standing trial or being, sentenced is mandatory." F.
& D. MCINTYRE, JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED & THE LAw 361 (1961).
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORN, MENTAL ILLNESS,
DUE PROCESS & THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 123 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as
N.Y. BAR REPORT]: "Courts should be granted discretion, where appropriate
LINDMAN

See also
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Since Baxstrom v. Herold,"' the United States Supreme
Court has required that state prisoners, in order to be committed
to mental institutions at the completion of sentence, must be
afforded the same procedural rights to jury review of commitment as all citizens committed civilly. 9 Reasoning from
Baxstromnn, the Court in the instant case was unable to reconcile
the different Indiana procedures used for criminal and civil commitment:
"If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are
insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally
available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges
surely cannot suffice."' 1
While Indiana procedures for civil commitment2 required either
dangerousness or inability to properly care for one's self, those
for criminal commitment required only incapacity to stand trial.
To be eligible for release, the accused patient had to regain competency to stand trial; whereas the civil patient could be released
when his condition "justified"23 it. The Court concluded that the
existence of these procedural discrepancies merely because of
pending criminal charges denied petitioner equal protection of
the law.
Respondent argued that the Indiana procedures were essento order suitable alternatives to hospitalization of defendants mentally unfit
to be tried."
17. Morris, "Criminality" and the Right of Treatment, 36 U. CH. L. REV.
784 (1969). Patients institutionalized through criminal channels are incarcerated on an average ten times longer than those through civil commitment.
18. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See also United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold,
410 F.2d 1071, 1081 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969): "Baxtrom v.
Herold . . . sparked an awareness that we cannot tolerate two classes of
insane persons-criminal and non-criminal-where we are asked to examine
commitment procedures available to both."
19. Prior to this ruling, state prisoners who, after conviction, had become insane during their prison term, were denied a jury review of their
civil commitment, contrary to the general provision of said jury review for
all civil commitments.
20. The Baxstrom principle has been applied to commitment following
insanity acquittal. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cameron
v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224
N.E.2d 87 (1966).
21. Jackson v. Indiana, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 1851 (1972).
22. BURNS' IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1209 (now IND. CODE § 16-14-9-9 (Supp.
1971)); id. § 22-1907 (now IND. CODE § 16-15-1-3 (Supp. 1971)).

23. Id. § 22-1814 (now IND. CODE § 16-15-4-12 (Supp. 1971)).
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tially the same as the federal and, therefore, should be upheld.
In Greenwood v. United States,2 4 the accused challenged his commitment due to present incapacity because his condition was not
temporary and unlikely to respond to treatment. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute pertaining to the
commitment of persons charged with federal crime who are
mentally incompetent to stand trial,25 since in addition to being
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to
assist in his own defense, a showing of the dangerousness of the
accused was also required. The Court in Jackson distinguished
Greenwood on the basis of the federal requirement of a dangerous propensity of the accused and ruled that Indiana could not
constitutionally commit under its existing criminal standard.
Beyond considering the criteria for commitment and release,
the Court also examined the duration of confinement and directed
"that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense
who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."
Consequently, the Court decided that after such reasonable
period of time, the accused must be either civilly committed or
released. Because Indiana's statute did not make the prospect of
defendant's regaining capacity to stand trial a relevant factor,
an accused with little chance of ever improving would be condemned for life to a mental institution merely because of pending
criminal charges.T
24. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).

Following Greenwood, federal courts have re-

quired that the accused be dangerous to support indefinite commitment.
Accord, United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372 (4th Cir. 1969); United States
ex rel. Daniels v. Johnson, 328 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cook v. Ciccone,
312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp.
4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Maurietta v. Ciccone, 305 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1969).

25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48 (1970).
26. 92 S. Ct. at 1858.
27. A step in this direction was taken by LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 648 which
provides that "[alt any time after commitment, on recommendation of the
superintendent of the institution that the defendant will not be helped by
being held in custody and may be released without danger to himself and
to others,- the court may order the defendant released on probation." However, effective utilization of this provision requires understanding application by the courts.

NOTES
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Justice Blackmun's opinion reflects deep concern by the
Supreme Court with the role of mental commitment in the criminal justice system. Recognizing the need for alternative procedures 2- to allow progress in the disposition of charges against an
incompetent defendant, the Jackson decision vests the initiative
with the states.2 9 If the states fail to respond to this problem, a
more explicit mandate by the Court should be forthcoming,
consistent with the implications of the instant case. 80
The unanimous decision in Jackson can best be explained
by the Court's "substantial doubts about whether the rationale
for pretrial commitment-that care or treatment will aid the
accused in attaining competency-is empirically valid given the
state of most of our mental institutions."3' 1 Coupled with this
suspicion is the expanding role of legal counsel" in the criminal
justice system. Procedures for determination of trial capacity
evolved prior to wide availability of legal representation to the
criminally accused. Today, "absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 3
The procedure of declaring trial incapacity requires a reanalysis of its actual effectiveness in protecting the accused from
unjust punishment, its ostensible purpose. Commitment to a
mental institution is often as onerous and debilitating as incarceration in prison. Furthermore, collateral effects of commitment
on the defendant's ability to prove his innocence are evident.84
28. See also People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill.2d 281, 263 N.E.2d
109 (1970); Neely v. Hogan, 62 Misc. 2d 1056, 310 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1970); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.06 (3) (Official Proposed Draft, 1962).
29. "We do not know if Indiana would approve procedures such as those

mentioned here, but these possibilities will be open on remand." 92 S. Ct.
at 1859.
30. "In

light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of

evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt
to prescribe arbitrary time limits."

Id.

at 1858.

31. Id. at 1856. See DeGrazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. Cm.
L. Rv. 339 (1955).

32. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972); Gideon v. Wain,
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012 (1972).
34. Commenting on competency of a tranquilized defendant: "For the
innocent defendant it means an opportunity to establish his innocence, rather
than to spend the remainder of his life as a 'forgotten man' in the criminally
insane ward of a mental hospital." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Criminal Procedure, 30 LA. L. REV. 309, 316
(1969); see State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So.2d 311 (1969); State v.
Plaisance, 252 La. 212, 210 So.2d 323 (1968).
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Long suspension of the criminal trial"5 could result in loss of
evidence and jeopardize the constitutional guarantees 86 of speedy
trial, right to bail, due process, and protection against cruel and
unusual punishment.
In immediate response to the instant case, trial courts must
greatly reduce both the imposition and duration of pretrial incapacity commitment. 7 Effective implementation of Jackson also
necessitates a revision of existing state procedures. It is suggested
that because of the resulting loss of liberty 8 to the defendant,
the prosecution ought not be allowed to raise the issue of incapacity to stand trial.' 9 Furthermore, the accused, despite his
incapacity, has a right to raise affirmative defenses to exculpate
himself from guilt.40 Once committed, the patient should be integrated 4' into the general hospital population, guaranteed the
35. "A blanket suspension of all further proceedings against the indicted
defendant is more burden than a blessing in this age of universal representation of counsel." N.Y. BAR REPORT 108; see Foote, A Comment on PreTrial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 842
(1960): "There is no doubt that production of an affirmative defense may
be seriously jeopardized by delay ....
" See also United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891,
894 (1955).
36. "There is now almost unanimous questioning of the constitutionality
of so confining any mentally ill persons other than (1) convicted prisoners
under sentence, or (2) non-prisoners found too dangerous for a civil hospital
by judicial procedure with all the due process and procedural safeguards
to which any person is entitled." N.Y. BAR REPORT 228.
37. Many forensic medical authorities recommend that pretrial commitment be used only for temporary gross behavioral incapacity of the
defendant. See T. SZASZ, LAw, LIBERTY & PSYCHIATRY 159-68 (1963).
38. "[Clonfinement in a mental hospital is as full and effective a deprivation of personal liberty as is confinement in jail." Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d
222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See generally Comment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454 (1962);
Vann, PretrialDetention and Judicial Decision Making, 43 U. DET. L.J. 13,
24 (1965): "I believe the facts indicate that commitment to a mental hospital is often considered a satisfactory substitute for . . . the punishment
of the accused."
39. As a strategic consideration of the prosecution, establishing incapacity may become an easier method of securing "imprisonment" than by
proving the guilt of the charges. "It is unusual for a defendant to plead
mental incompetency to stand trial, and for good reason: doing so would be
more likely to harm him than to help him ....
In the vast majority of these
cases, it Is not the. defendant or his agent, who raises this issue, but the
prosecution or the court." T. SzASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JusTicE 21 (1965). But see
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 642, comment (a): "Although present incapacity to
stand trial is ordinarily urged by the defense, it may be raised by the district attorney or on the court's own motion."
40. See note 30 supra.
41. "[S]egregated treatment of any class of mental patient . . . is inherently unequal, inherently discriminatory, and inherently unjust." Morris,
The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally Ill "Non-Criminal Criminals" in New York, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 393,
428-29 (1969). See also an earlier portion of the Morris article at 17 BUFFALO
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"right to treatment," 42 afforded the full range of treatment modalities,43 and re-evaluated at least monthly. 44 Finally, the period
of defendant's institutionalization should be credited toward
45
sentence should a subsequent conviction result.
At this writing, most mental institutions are custodial asylums, not hospitals. 46 Rectification of this situation can only be
accomplished by major re-evaluation of existing attitude coupled
with considerable outlay of funds. State legislatures should give
L. REV. 651 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Integration of all patients would eliminate the "good" sick man, "bad" sick man
dichotomy. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why
Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Morris, "Criminality" and the Right of Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 784, 787 (1969).
42. Absent treatment, the institution is transformed into a penitentiary.
See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Nason v. Superintendent, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (constitutional right to treatment).
43. Contemporary psychiatric techniques emphasize therapeutic benefit
to the patient of remaining incorporated into society, even if only on a
minimal basis. Many formerly uncontrollable patients are now able to
function with therapy and medication.
44. Longer periods between re-evaluation of patient's capacity to stand
trial would seem to violate due process of law. But cf. LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 649 which provides no time requirement for the recurring evaluation of
a committed accused by medical authorities: "At any time after a defendant's commitment, if the superintendent of the mental institution reports
to the committing court that the defendant presently has the mental capacity to proceed, the court shall hold a contradictory hearing within thirty
days on that issue. Prior to such hearing, the court shall appoint counsel
to represent the defendant if the defendant does not have counsel, and
may order a mental examination by a sanity commission appointed in conformity with Article 644.
"If the committing court does not hold a hearing within the thirty days,
the superintendent of the mental institution shall forthwith return the defendant to the sheriff of the parish from which the 'defendant was committed, and the sheriff shall receive and hold the defendant in custody
pending further orders of the committing court.
"The district attorney or the defense may apply to the court to have
the proceedings resumed, on the ground that the defendant presently has
the mental capacity to proceed. Upon receipt of such application the court
shall hold a contradictory hearing if there is reasonable ground to believe
that the defendant presently has the mental capacity to proceed. The court
may direct the superintendent of the mental institution where the defendant is committed to make a report and recommendation, prior to such
hearing, as to whether the defendant presently has capacity to proceed, or
may order an independent mental examination by a sanity commission
appointed in conformity with Article 644.
"Reports as to present mental capacity to proceed shall be filed in conformity with Article 645, and the court's determination of present mental
capacity to proceed shall be made In conformity with the appropriate
provisions of Articles 646 and 647.
"If the court determines that the defendant has the mental capacity
to proceed, the proceedings shall be promptly resumed."
45. Under existing conditions, time-committed credit would prevent dual
punishment.
46. See Comment, 81 HAsv. L. REv. 454, 472-73 (1967); N.Y. BAR REPoRT
72-77, 102-05, 186-90.
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sympathetic consideration to the solutions of the many problems
concerning the plight of the sometimes "forgotten man" in the
criminally insane wards of our mental institutions.
Joseph W. Rausch

UNTAXED RETENTION OF BROAD MANAGERIAL CONTROL
Decedent gratuitously transferred the voting common stock
of three closely-held family corporations to an inter-vivos trust,
the stock constituting the principal trust property. He retained
the powers (1) to vote the stock held by the trust, (2) to appoint
a successor corporate trustee, and (3) to veto the transfer of any
trust assets by the trustee. The Commissioner determined that
the stock was includable in decedent's gross estate;' the estate
paid the alleged deficiency and sued for refund. The United
States Supreme Court held that decedent's retained right to vote
the common stock of a small corporation held in trust, which,
combined with decedent's own stock, gave him voting control
of the corporation, and the retained right to veto any transfers
of that stock constituted neither retention of (a) the enjoyment
of or right to income from the stock, nor (b) the right to determine the persons who may enjoy the property in the trust, either
of which would make the stock includable in the gross estate
of decedent for estate tax computation. United States v. Byrum,
92 S. Ct. 2382 (1972).
The Internal Revenue Code includes in a gross estate the
value of transfers made during the lifetime of the transferor,
either when such transfers are not complete at the time they
2
are made, or when they are deemed essentially testamentary.
Prior to 1931, some such incomplete transfers were considered
taxable as transfers intended to take effect (in possession or
enjoyment) at or after death.8 However, in that year the Supreme Court in May v. Heiner,4 emphasizing the technical passof 1954, § 2036(a)(1), (2).
2. Section 2037 taxes certain transfers where the decedent reserved a
"reversionary interest," and § 2038 taxes transfers in which he maintained
the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate Interests in the property
transferred. Transfers made in contemplation of death are regulated by §
2035.
3. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302, 44 Stat. 70.
4. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
1. INT. Rzv. CoD

